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THE HOUSING CRASH AND THE END OF 
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 
Matt Stoller* 
No man who owns his own house and lot can be a Communist.  He 
has too much to do.1  
William Levitt, architect of post-WW II suburbia 
 
We have a lot of kids graduating college, can’t find jobs . . . .  That’s 
what happened in Cairo.  That’s what happened in Madrid. You 
don’t want those kinds of riots here.2 
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 2011 
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 1. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 231 (1985). 
 2. Erin Einhorn & Corky Siemaszko, Mayor Bloomberg Predicts Riots in the 
Streets If Economy Doesn’t Create More Jobs, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-09-16/local/30186558_1_mayor-bloomberg-jobs-
plan-president-obama. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To many Americans, it feels like the United States is a different 
country than it was just a few years ago.  It is hard to explain to teen-
agers today that there was a time, even a short time ago, when politi-
cal institutions did not seem riddled with corruption and when Amer-
icans were not split by stark economic and political lines.  Such 
memories increasingly describe what sounds like a foreign land, not 
the American system we know today.  The narrative is widely under-
stood: economic gains go to the top while costs and risk are shifted 
onto everyone else. 
The most obvious economic manifestation of this difference is the 
foreclosure crisis.  Much as divorce became a culturally common ac-
tivity in the 1960s, the rise of a foreclosure epidemic has made the loss 
of a home a searing but familiar experience for tens of millions of 
Americans. 
Why is this happening?  Why now?  And why are American politi-
cal and cultural leaders ratifying this shift by collectively asserting, as 
the U.S. Bank CEO framed it to frustrated business owners in No-
vember 2011, as essentially stop whining and “get over it”?3  An ex-
ploration of the American housing system provides clarification on 
these questions; it is housing as a whole that has led the change, as 
both a foundational element of the American community and the key 
financial link between the elite sectors of the economy and the popu-
lation. 
The relationship between the shifting housing environment and the 
rest of American life is profound.  In April 2011, President Barack 
Obama reversed a seventy-five-year government policy framework by 
encouraging renting over home buying.4  Brian Moynihan, the CEO 
of Bank of America, echoed this shift a few days later, saying that 
Americans should no longer look at their homes as “asset[s]” but in-
stead solely as “great place[s] to live.”5  This policy reversal points to 
a deceptively simple, yet unanswered, question about the current 
 
 3. Gregory Pratt, U.S. Bank President Richard Davis to Disillusioned Business 
Owners: “Get over It,” CITYPAGES PROTEST NEWS BLOG (Nov. 1, 2011, 3:33 PM), 
http://blogs.citypages.com/blotter/2011/11/us_bank_president_richard_davis_get_over
_it.php. 
 4. Martin Fridson, Obama Pushes Renting, Making it Easier to Whack Fannie 
and Freddie, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2011/04/12 
/obama-pushes-renting-making-it-easier-to-whack-fannie-and-freddie. 
 5. BofA CEO: Owners Shouldn’t Look at Home as an Asset, MSNBC (Apr. 12, 
2011), http://news.mobile.msn.com/en-us/article_biz.aspx?aid=42556230&afid=1. 
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American economic order: why has the political system been unable 
to arrest or mitigate the millions of foreclosures that have taken place 
since 2006? 
There will be roughly six to twelve million foreclosures from 2006 
to 2014.6  This wave, which is highly deflationary in terms of its impact 
on the housing market, will reduce the most broadly held source of 
wealth for most Americans: home equity.  The closer one gets to the 
problem, the more puzzling it becomes.  Not acting to protect hous-
ing, the primary source of wealth for the middle class, is a radical pol-
icy choice.  Why make it? 
There are precedents in dealing with a debt overhang, the most ob-
vious parallel being a write-down of debt in response to the United 
States’ foreclosure epidemic of the 1930s.  Yet policy-makers and 
business leaders have done virtually nothing; their lack of action has 
been coordinated and bipartisan.  Debt is fundamentally a set of so-
cial relationships, and political leaders will not willingly alter those re-
lationships to restore an equitable social contract unless forced to do 
so. 
The thesis of this Article is that this wave of foreclosures signals 
the end of an older social contract and the beginning of a period of 
deep political and economic instability.  The crash of the housing 
market radically altered the wealth and power distribution mecha-
nisms for the American political order.  For much of American histo-
ry, housing operated as a proxy for wealth and stability.7  From the 
1930s onward, it offered a route to wealth for a majority of the popu-
lation, while allowing the banking system to serve as a channel 
through which the Federal Reserve could manage the economy.  
 
 6. According to the Congressional Oversight Panel, there is no reliable federal 
source of foreclosure data. See Ryan Grim, Foreclosure: In the Midst of Crisis, No 
Reliable Data, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2009/05/06/foreclosure-in-the-midst_n_198207.html.  I have compiled these estimates 
from a speech by Federal Reserve Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin given on Novem-
ber 12, 2010 called “Problems in the Mortgage Servicing Industry.” See Sarah Bloom 
Raskin, Governor, Federal Reserve, Address at the Nat’l Consumer Law Center’s 
Consumer Rights Litig. Conf.: Problems in the Mortgage Servicing Industry (Nov. 12, 
2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20101112a.htm.  
While there are not reliable numbers, it is quite obvious the foreclosure epidemic is 
vast and numbers in the millions.  Laurie Goodman of Amherst Securities believes 
that there are as many as ten million more households who will default from 2012 
onward on top of those who have been foreclosed from 2006 to 2011. See Jon Prior, 
10 Million More Mortgages Set to Default, Expert Says, HOUSINGWIRE (Sept. 20, 
2011), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/09/20/amherst-to-senate-10-million-more-
mortgages-set-to-default. 
 7. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 50. 
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Over time, as financial asset growth replaced wage growth, housing 
became a leverage point masking the deterioration in America’s fi-
nancial status.  The housing crash, far from a simple downturn in one 
sector of the economy, represents the collapse of this entire appa-
ratus.  The result is increasing political chaos, rising authoritarian 
structures, and social unrest. 
In other words, the financial crisis snapped the spine of an implicit 
social contract, one that aligned the interests of the governing class 
and the citizenry.  This fissure becomes evident in a change in the cor-
relation of corporate profits with home equity—from 1950 onward, 
these moved in tandem.  But in 2010 they split apart, throwing our 
traditional political model and distribution mechanism for wealth into 
uncharted waters. 
 
Figure 1.  Corporate Profits After Tax; Owners’ Equity in Household Real Es-
tate—New Worth—Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations8 
 
 
This Article identifies two distinct eras in which the housing mar-
ket played a pivotal role in regulating economic growth and social 
stability: the New Deal “High Trust” social contract era and the 
Reagan-era “Low Trust” social contract era.  Over the course of sev-
enty years, the housing finance system became the primary wealth 
distribution mechanism through which wealth was distributed.  The 
 
 8. Data obtained with permission from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Eco-
nomic Research, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org (last 
visited June 18, 2012). 
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national housing stock and finance system served different social aims 
during these eras, but the housing system remained unchanged 
throughout these periods, thereby acting as a national regulator. 
Government policies like the home mortgage interest deduction 
and cheap Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans encouraged 
broad-based wealth distribution, which took the form of home equity.  
While the New Deal and the Reagan-era housing systems differed in 
their basic social models and inequities, they were politically stable.  
The current financial crisis has eroded our housing system so much 
that we are entering a new era of fluctuating and unstable politics and 
finance, in an era in which earlier social guarantees are no longer val-
id. 
Now many Americans are beginning to question the legitimacy of 
the democratic system in which they were raised.  Pew and Gallup 
polls consistently show that public support for governing institutions 
—public schools, the Supreme Court, Congress, the media—are at 
historic lows.9  With support for home purchases ebbing and political 
representation increasingly dominated by large, moneyed interests, it 
is unclear what sustains political stability in the face of a lack of public 
faith in political institutions and a lack of broadly distributed stake-
holder society.  Politicians like homeownership because it deters radi-
calism.10  This Article considers the converse. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF THE HOUSING SYSTEM IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY AMERICA 
A. The Modern Conundrum 
One mystery underlying modern politics is why neither political 
coalition has been able to stop the devastating wave of foreclosures 
that began in 2006, despite the politically problematic misery it 
caused.  A foreclosure costs money to many parties, not just the 
homeowner.11  Powerful, wealthy banks and investors, who own 
 
 9. See Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/conf 
idence-institutions.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2012); Distrust, Discontent, Anger and 
Partisan Rancor: The People and Their Government, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 1–2, 
4 (Apr. 18, 2010), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf. 
 10. See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 890, 896–98 (2011). 
 11. We All Pay a Price for the Foreclosure Crisis, AMERICANS FOR FIN. REFORM 
(Feb. 28, 2011, 9:39 AM), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2011/02/we-all-pay-a-price-
for-the-foreclosure-crisis.  This is a good compilation of the literature on the costs of 
foreclosures. 
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mortgage debt, lose, homeowners lose, communities lose, and politi-
cians lose.12  A foreclosure epidemic magnifies the losses.  It is odd, to 
say the least, that arresting the foreclosure epidemic is not on the po-
litical menu for 2012.13 
Housing has been an important element of the American social 
contract for four generations, and this failure to grapple with—or 
even acknowledge in any serious way—the loss of the American 
home is beyond the experience of any American living today.  Ameri-
can Presidents have consistently lauded the benefits of homeowner-
ship.  Ronald Reagan said that homeownership “supplies stability and 
rootedness.”14  Lyndon Johnson went even further: “[O]wning a 
home can increase responsibility and stake out a man’s place in his 
community . . . .  The man who owns a home has something to be 
proud of and reason to protect and preserve it.”15  "  And William 
Levitt, the architect of the modern suburb, gave what is probably the 
most illuminating rationale for homeownership when he said in 1948, 
"No man who owns his own house and lot can be a Communist.  He 
has too much to do."16 
This pro-home ownership rhetoric is backed by enormous financial 
and social incentives.  In the United States, voting behavior and ac-
cess to economic rights are highly correlated with homeownership.17  
Aside from its social benefits, housing has been an important channel 
for transmitting monetary policy, even if it is not explicitly recognized 
as such.18  Every post-war recovery has been led by fixed residential 
 
 12. See id.; Thomas Ferguson & Jie Chen, 1, 2, 3, Many Tea Parties? A Closer 
Look at the 2010 Massachusetts Senate Race 10 (Apr. 13, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/FergusonFinal_0. 
pdf. 
 13. Huma Khan, Little Talk of Housing Crisis on the Campaign Trail, ABC NEWS 
NOTE BLOG (Oct. 20, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/ 
little-talk-of-housing-crisis-on-campaign-trail. 
 14. U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URBAN DEV., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ITS BENEFITS, 
URBAN POLICY BRIEF NO. 2 (1995) [hereinafter HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ITS BENE-
FITS], available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/txt/hdbrf2.txt.  
 15. Id. 
 16. JACKSON, supra note 1. 
 17. See Matthew J. Holian, Homeownership, Dissatisfaction and Voting, 20 J. 
HOUSING ECON. 267, 275 (2011). 
 18. See generally Frederic S. Mishkin, Housing and the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, 
Working Paper No. 2007-40, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
feds/2007/200740/200740pap.pdf (finding the housing market to be of “central con-
cern to monetary policy makers” as a “monetary transmission mechanism”). 
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investment.19  On a political level, the coalition backing homeowner-
ship—Wall Street and the construction and real estate sectors—
meant that broad-based homeownership as a policy priority could de-
liver wealth throughout society.20 
What happened to this system?  Why did the Bush administration, 
and then the Obama administration, remain inert in the face of its 
collapse?21  Why have all attempts from well-meaning Congressional 
and regulatory actors to remediate this situation failed?22  To under-
stand how deeply rooted the problem is, we need to understand the 
national consensus underlying our economic foundations, a consensus 
first established in the 1930s through a set of financial institutions that 
flowered in the 1940s and 1950s alongside the rise of suburbia.23  
From there we will see that this consensus, and the institutions it re-
quired, was altered, but not destroyed, by the Reaganite political rea-
lignment of the late 1970s and early 1980s.24  Then we will travel 
through the housing boom and bust, tracing the political contours of 
the shift.25  After this journey, it should become clear that the Obama 
administration’s economic policy failures have come from the fractur-
ing of the political coalition underlying broad prosperity for the mid-
dle class.26  We will further see that rebuilding some sort of stable coa-
lition is the order of the day.27 
B. The New Deal Social Contract 
The nation’s housing system was set up during the Great Depres-
sion and World War II in the context of an effort to reconstruct social 
 
 19. When the Roof Fell in, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com 
/node/18250439.  
 20. See Fridson, supra note 4. 
 21. Matt Stoller, The Big Banks Win Again: Foreclosure Victims Get Little Help 
in a Mortgage-Settlement Plan that Only Benefits the Banks’ Bottom Line, SALON 
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/02/10/banks_get_off_easy_in_mortgage_ 
settlement_deal. 
 22. David Dayen, HAMP Is Hurting Liberalism, FIREDOGLAKE (July 26, 2010), 
http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/07/26/hamp-is-hurting-liberalism; Tami Luhby, Has 
Obama’s Housing Policy Failed?, CNN MONEY (Jan. 18, 2012), http://money.cnn.com 
/2012/01/18/news/economy/Obama_housing/index.htm. 
 23. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 190–218, 231–36.   
 24. THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE 
DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 114–37 (1987). 
 25. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 26. See discussion infra Parts I.C, I.D. 
 27. See discussion infra Part II. 
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stability by proposing a particular sort of social contract.28  The basic 
premise of this contract was matching secure thirty-year jobs with 
thirty-year mortgages, allowing people to develop bonds with their 
homes and therefore committing themselves to social stability.29  Both 
private and public actors matched their organizational models to 
promoting and sustaining this social contract.30  The supporting finan-
cial system was built in the 1930s out of the ashes of a banking col-
lapse: the post-World War II “Fair Deal” environment took ad-
vantage of these new financial institutional arrangements to shift 
resources from war production to the construction of the suburbs and 
a consumer economy.31 
In the spring of 1933, the private housing finance system was 
groaning under the weight of collapsed demand and limited liquidi-
ty.32  Foreclosures were running at over a thousand a day, and half of 
all mortgages were in default, threatening the viability of a semi-
toppled banking system.33  As part of a restructuring of the financial 
system, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt established a new set of 
institutions to support homeownership.34  He pursued a series of radi-
cal innovations so that the government addressed market failures, 
building on the early work of the Hoover administration.35  By shift-
ing traditional constitutional boundaries, the Roosevelt administra-
tion created the institutional framework to support an explicit set of 
industrial and residential goals.36 
Though opposed in his attempts to reorganize the financial system, 
Roosevelt had a favorable political environment.  The nature of the 
downturns and the collapse of the existing social order were unlike 
 
 28. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 
47–56 (1991) (discussing how the New Deal, and particularly Supreme Court deci-
sions during that era, changed the public’s perception that states’ autonomy was par-
amount and that the existing constitutional framework demanded a smaller, less-
active federal government). 
 29. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 206 (discussing suburbanization in the New 
York City area during the early 1950s and how that trend became a stereotype of the 
American way of life). 
 30. Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century Amer-
ica 16 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 07-17, 2007), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984330. 
 31. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 231–33. 
 32. Id. at 193. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 195, 203, 221, 224. 
 35. See, e.g., JESSE H. JONES WITH EDWARD ANGLY, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS: MY 
THIRTEEN YEARS WITH THE RFC (1932–1945) 165 (1951). 
 36. ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 47, 53, 107. 
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anything anyone had ever experienced in America at the time.  The 
Great Depression was a “balance sheet” downturn, with a deflation-
ary spiral leading to foreclosures and home price depreciation.37  The 
deflation was especially vicious due to the characteristics of the hous-
ing finance market of the 1920s.  The typical mortgage prior had been 
a five-year loan with a large down payment and a balloon payment to 
handle the balance at the end of the loan term.38  Homeowners would 
typically roll over their mortgages, expecting lenders to have credit at 
the ready.39  The collapse of the banking system thus led to a substan-
tial number of liquidity-driven foreclosures, as homeowners could not 
afford the lump sum to pay off their mortgage balances, nor could 
they find lenders to continue offering credit.40 
The most significant policy response to this problem was the 
Homeowner Loan Corporation (HOLC), which was designed to alle-
viate the housing problem as well as relieve pressure on the banking 
system caused by the foreclosure crisis.41  This corporation sold bonds 
to lenders in return for home mortgages, which it then held or re-
financed.42  The government seeded the HOLC with capital from the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), the industrial bank set 
up by Hoover to handle the banking collapse.43 
The HOLC alone refinanced one tenth of all owner-occupied, non-
farm residences in the United States (ninety-nine percent of eligible 
occupants applied for loans in Mississippi).44  It created the long-term 
amortizing fixed mortgage, which was established at twenty years but 
eventually lengthened to thirty.45  The government created the FHA 
 
 37. See Atif Mian et al., Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the 
Aftermath of Financial Crises 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 17831, 2012). 
 38. Laura Bramble, The Amortization of a Mortgage, S.F. GATE HOME GUIDES 
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/amortization-mortgage-2809.html (last visited Apr. 11, 
2012). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 195–97.   
 42. Jonathan D. Rose, The Incredible HOLC? Mortgage Relief During the Great 
Depression, 43 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 1073, 1079 (2010). 
 43. SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, FINAL REPORT ON THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE 
CORPORATION 1, 16 (1957) [hereinafter TREASURY FINAL REPORT], available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/rcf/rfc_19590506_finalreport.pdf. 
 44. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 196.   
 45. Id. at 196–97, 204.   
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in 193446 and what would later become Fannie Mae, the RFC-
financed Federal National Mortgage Association in 1938.47  Addition-
ally, the government established national building standards for 
homes, ratings systems for neighborhoods, a secondary market for 
mortgages, and a stable federally-insured and professionally-managed 
Savings and Loan industry.48 
The HOLC established standards for the refinancing of home 
mortgages, transforming large lump fixed debts into small affordable 
monthly payments, and mapped neighborhoods to assess credit 
risks.49  The anti-slum, anti-density model of development, pushed by 
cultural conservatives such as Edward Bok of Ladies’ Home Journal, 
influenced how credit was allocated, and led to the spacious auto-
dependent suburban tract house.50  The FHA then took these com-
munity standards and used them in its decisions about how to insure 
mortgages.51  The Savings and Loan industry adopted FHA standards 
for credit allocation.52 
Although Roosevelt was able to restore some normalcy in the 
housing market after the collapse of 1933, the homeownership rate 
did not surpass its 1930 level until the next decade.53  The nascent 
New Deal housing finance system did not meet its real test until the 
post-war housing shortages.54  Millions of servicemen returned home 
to start families, even as the residential construction industry had 
been dormant for nearly sixteen years of depression and war.55  These 
families had liquid assets from saved military pay and they had been 
 
 46. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), HUD.GOV http://portal.hud.gov 
/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahistory (last visited Apr. 11, 
2012).   
 47. See Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, TIME BUS. 
(July 14, 2008), available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,18227 
66,00.html.  
 48. See id. at 203, 216; see also TREASURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 12–13 
(discussing the secondary market for mortgages). 
 49. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 196–97. 
 50. Id. at 186. 
 51. See id. at 199–200; see also Manuel B. Aalbers, The Financialization of Home 
and Mortgage Market Crisis, 12 COMPETITIVE CHANGE 148, 153–54 (2008), available 
at http://home.staff.uva.nl/m.b.aalbers/bestanden/Aalbers_The%20Financialization% 
20of%20Home%20and%20the%20Mortgage%20Market%20Crisis.pdf. 
 52. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 204. 
 53. See Historical Census of Housing Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www. 
census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).   
 54. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 232. 
 55. Id. 
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promised suburban housing by the government and industry.56  
Household formation was high and remained high for the next two 
decades, but there were virtually no homes for sale at the war’s end.57  
In Chicago, trolley cars were sold as homes; in Omaha there were ads 
for iceboxes that could be used as housing; in North Dakota, people 
lived in surplus grain bins.58 
The Veterans Administration, which guaranteed loans to returning 
veterans from World War II, met the demand for housing by using 
FHA guidelines.59  An enormous construction industry emerged.60  
Almost half of all housing could claim FHA or Veterans Affairs (VA) 
financing in the 1950s and 1960s.61  Home purchases after World War 
II rose dramatically, along the lines laid out by the HOLC and adopt-
ed by the FHA and across the industry.62  First-time homebuyers and 
veterans had access to government financing, and still do.63 
FHA standards could well be considered a key part of the “social 
contract” established by the government on behalf of the home buy-
ing public.  According to Kenneth Jackson: 
Eight criteria were established (the numbers in parentheses reflect 
the percentage weight given to each): Relative economic stability 
(40 percent) Protection from adverse influences (20 percent) Free-
dom from special hazards (5 percent) Adequacy of civic, social, and 
commercial centers (5 percent) Adequacy of transportation (10 per-
cent) Sufficiency of utilities and conveniences (5 percent) Level of 
taxes and special assessments (5 percent) Appeal (10 percent).64 
In addition, the FHA retained inherited racist biases, with one un-
derwriting guide noting: “If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is 
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same 
 
 56. Id. at 232–33. 
 57. Id. at 232. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 204.   
 60. See id. (“Builders went back to work, and housing starts and sales began to 
accelerate rapidly in 1936. They rose to 332,000 in 1937, to 399,000 in 1938, to 458,000 
in 1939, to 530,000 in 1940, and to 619,000 in 1941. This was a startling lift from the 
93,000 starts of 1933. After World War II, the numbers became even larger, and by 
the end of 1972, FHA helped nearly eleven million families to own houses and an-
other twenty-two million families to improve their properties.”). 
 61. Id. at 215. 
 62. Id. at 215–16. 
 63. See The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), supra note 44;  Information 
on the Home Loan Program, U.S. DEP’T VETERAN AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/ 
homeloans/veteran.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 64. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 207. 
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social and racial classes.”65  Housing did not represent the totality of 
the New Deal social contract.66  Efforts to rescue and reconstruct the 
housing system must be understood as a subset of an overall explicit 
national industrial policy pursued by the Roosevelt administration to 
combat the Depression and then fight World War II.  For instance, 
the federal government’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation would 
play a role in capitalizing most important initiatives of the New Deal 
and World War II, including what would become Fannie Mae, the 
FHA, housing finance for soldiers, and the business lending market-
place.67  These efforts must also be understood as reliant on key deci-
sions made in the 1930s to deal with the debt overhang, an abrogation 
of creditor contract rights.  In 1933, Roosevelt broke the link between 
the dollar and gold, reflating the currency.68  He also nullified gold-
index clauses, which had allowed parties to demand payment in dol-
lars or in gold equivalents of dollars.69  By removing fixed sums of 
gold, he unmoored the economy from what Keynes called a “barba-
rous relic” that arbitrarily increased the burden of debt servicing.70  
Government intervention in the housing market was consistent with a 
new role for government intermediating between creditors and debt-
ors (including on an international scale in the post-war Bretton 
Woods system).71 
Other important elements of this new social contract included la-
bor bargaining power through mass unionization, Social Security, free 
or low-cost college education for veterans, a national highway system, 
and eventually Medicare.72  Americans saw their wages increase, the 
economy grew rapidly, corporate profits increased, and the financial 
sector strengthened.73  Union density increased enormously, until 
 
 65. Id. at 208. 
 66. See Levy & Temin, supra note 30, at 17–18. 
 67. See JONES, supra note 35, at 146–52. 
 68. See Peter Temin & Barrie A. Wigmore, The End of One Big Deflation, 27 
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 483, 488–89 (1990), available at http://economics.mit. 
edu/files/7257.  
 69. Randall S. Kroszner, Is it Better to Forgive than to Receive?  Repudiation of 
the Gold Indexation Clause in Long-Term Debt During the Great Depression 1 (Oct. 
1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/finance/ 
papers/repudiation11.pdf. 
 70. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, MONETARY REFORM 187 (1924).   
 71. JEFF MADRICK, AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE AND THE DECLINE 
OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT 62 (2011). 
 72. See Levy & Temin, supra note 30, at 18. 
 73. See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERAL-
ISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1996) (examining the consolidation of this social con-
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roughly a third of working Americans belonged to a union.74  A dis-
proportionately high number of AFL-CIO members owned a home, 
perhaps a testament to how American domestic unions helped tem-
per radical impulses.75 
This social contract relied on high and increasing wages and a tol-
erable amount of labor unrest.76  From the end of the war to the early 
1970s, a high density of unionization and full employment gave labor 
substantial power to demand its share in economic gains.77  This was 
the era of the “Treaty of Detroit,” an agreement between the United 
Auto Workers and automakers to increase wages and benefits steadi-
ly over time.78  There were wage gains in all income brackets.79 
During this period, American consumers used housing as a mecha-
nism to accumulate wealth, escaping from the rent-extractive behav-
ior of landlords and the predatory lenders that flourished in the 
1920s.80  Housing also served as an anchor for local community 
growth; public high schools carried legitimacy and educated citizens 
in a manner that broadly allowed most children to acquire the skills to 
move into the middle class and some degree of economic security.81  
Property was in many cases the tax basis for local and municipal ser-
vices, and credit allocation was key to post-war suburban segrega-
tion.82 
In this era, housing would last for a career and equity extraction 
occurred at retirement.  Cheap oil allowed for the growth of car-
dependent suburbs, which helped important national industries like 
automobiles and chemicals.83  Housing was a proxy for wealth and 
 
tract in the late 1930s and the 1940s).  Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.’s, Age of Roosevelt 
Series provides a reasonably comprehensive overview of the policy disputes and con-
sequences of the political fights of the 1930s and 1940s. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, 
JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: 1953–1936 (1960); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL: 1933–1935 (1958); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 
THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER: 1919–1933 (1957). 
 74. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 11 fig.1 (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu 
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace.  
 75. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 7. 
 76. See Levy & Temin, supra note 30, at 18. 
 77. See id. at 31. 
 78. See id. at 8.  
 79. See id. at 17. 
 80. ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., REGAINING THE DREAM: HOW TO RENEW THE 
PROMISE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR AMERICA’S WORKING FAMILIES 2–3 (2011). 
 81. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 147. 
 82. See id. at 196–203, 285. 
 83. See id. at 172. 
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stability, typically located near factories and the value-generating in-
stitutions of American power.84  
During the immediate post-war era, Americans put their savings 
into regulated savings institutions, which made mortgage and com-
mercial loans.85  This allowed the Federal Reserve to have a remarka-
ble degree of control over lending and borrowing in the economy, or 
the “transmission belt” from finance to the real economy.86  Housing 
in this era was connected to stable management of the economy by 
political elites through a highly regulated financial system.87  The 
Federal Reserve exercised tight control over the regulated banking 
system, and thus, to the economy itself. 
This was accomplished through a variety of institutional mecha-
nisms.  Savings and Loan thrifts were small and community-based, 
and local officers who knew the community in which they were lend-
ing did the credit analysis.88  National banks were not allowed to 
branch, and consumer credit was relatively restricted.89  FDIC insur-
ance covered much of the savings pools, and reserve balances were 
substantial.  In 1951, regulated depository institutions held 65% of fi-
nancial sector assets and liabilities; the Federal Reserve held 11.3% of 
all deposits as reserve balances.90  International capital controls en-
sured that public domestic institutions controlled the flow of money 
in the economy, and a dense set of rules prevented the ruinous bank 
competition over deposits that had fueled the credit creation of the 
1920’s stock market bubble.91 
As a result of the narrow channels of money flow, the Federal Re-
serve’s tools worked.  Interest rate increases and reserve require-
ments had a direct impact on the institutions that were lending to real 
world commercial interests and consumers.  When the Federal Re-
 
 84. See id. at 50. 
 85. See Jane D’Arista, Setting an Agenda for Monetary Reform 11 (Univ. of 
Mass. Amherst Pol. Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 190, 2009), available at 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_151-
200/WP190.pdf. 
 86. See id. at 11, 13. 
 87. See id. at 11. 
 88. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULA-
TION OF ACTIVITIES OF UNITARY SAVINGS AND LOAN, available at http://www.ots. 
treas.gov/_files/48035.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).   
 89. For a good overview of post-war finance, see MADRICK supra note 71, at 13–
20.   
 90. D’Arista, supra note 85, at 11.    
 91. MADRICK, supra note 71, at 13.  
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serve wanted to cool the economy, it could scale back bank lending.92  
This would show up first as a slowdown in housing starts.93  Similarly, 
when it wanted to boost the economy, it could ease funding costs for 
homeownership, and housing starts would lead the recovery.94  The 
political consensus that homeownership was a useful place to put re-
sources was part of this regulatory mechanism.95 
In this era, an inflationary boom could be moderated by a tax in-
crease or interest rate hike, and a recession would be followed by a 
recovery.  Every recovery was led by the housing sector, and business 
investment followed.96  Regardless of temporary economic conditions, 
the number of adults was always increasing, and so the number of 
households was always growing.97  In recessions, “pent-up demand” 
for housing would accumulate.98  When the Federal Reserve lowered 
interest rates or increased the amount of bank lending, housing starts 
would jump, followed by business investment.99  There was consensus 
that resources could be put into homeownership as a vehicle for eco-
nomic regulation.100 
There simply were no significant debates about the wisdom of allo-
cating capital into home-construction as a vehicle for economic regu-
 
 92. See Eric S. Rosengren, President & C.E.O., Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Re-
marks at the Economic Outlook Seminar, Stockholm, Sweden: Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery 3 (Sept. 28, 2011), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/news/speec 
hes/rosengren/2011/092811/092811.pdf (noting that the housing sector is very respon-
sive to monetary policy). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ITS BENEFITS, supra note 14. 
 96. See Rosengren, supra note 92, at 3 (“Historically, an outsized proportion of 
U.S. economic growth in the first two years of a recovery from a recession is generat-
ed by residential investment.”). 
 97. See The Story of Household Formation Weakness is About Families, SOBER 
LOOK (Jan. 16, 2012), http://soberlook.com/2012/01/story-of-household-formation-is-
about.html. 
 98. This is a fairly standard economic narrative, put best by Warren Buffett in his 
2012 shareholder letter on how “hormones” eventually lead the country out of a 
housing crisis by impacting household formation and thus demand for housing stock. 
Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to 
the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 25, 2012), available at http:// 
www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2011ltr.pdf. 
 99. See Private Investment and the Business Cycle, CALCULATEDRISK (Dec. 26, 
2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2011/12/private-investment-and-
business-cycle.html (“This is important to follow because residential investment tends 
to lead the economy, equipment and software is generally coincident, and nonresi-
dential structure investment lags the business cycle.”). 
 100. See, e.g., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ITS BENEFITS, supra note 14; Rosengren, su-
pra note 92.   
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lation.  Contrast this with the enormous political reaction against the 
Federal Reserve’s “quantitative easing” measures, or the “stimu-
lus.”101  There is currently no consensus about how to allocate nation-
al resources, but this was not true when housing flourished as the na-
tional wealth distributor.  Having a non-controversial fulcrum for 
credit deployment was a key regulatory mechanism for political 
elites.102 
Of all the New Deal institutional frameworks, the only one to con-
tinue expanding after 1968 was that of the housing finance complex.103  
The alignment of builders, homeowners, Wall Street, and politicians 
was far stronger than the consensus that underwrote other significant 
wealth-broadening programs such as Medicare or Social Security.104  
C. The Reagan Era Social Contract 
The political reconfiguration that broke the back of labor unions 
provided all the backing the dollar needed as the increased threat of 
unemployment proved a much more convincing anchor than gold 
for wealth owners around the world. 
Jane D’Arista and Korkut Erturk105 
The highly inflationary environment of the late 1960s and early 
1970s profoundly challenged, and ultimately broke, the New Deal so-
cial contract.  The chaos of the decade that followed eventually mold-
ed a new version of that national consensus, solidified during the ear-
ly part of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. 
Then-Federal Reserve Governor Paul Volcker could be considered 
one of the key, if not the most influential, architects of this new con-
 
 101. See, e.g., David Dayen, Politicizing the Fed: GOP Leaders Warn Bernanke 
Against Monetary Expansion, FIREDOGLAKE (Sept. 21, 2011, 6:10 AM), http://news. 
firedoglake.com/2011/09/21/politicizing-the-fed-gop-leaders-warn-bernanke-against-
monetary-expansion. 
 102. See, e.g., William C. Dudley, Pres. and C.E.O., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Housing and the Economic Recovery: Remarks at the New Jersey Bankers Associa-
tion Economic Forum, Iselin, N.J. (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed. 
org/newsevents/speeches/2012/dud120106.html. 
 103. See Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, Too Big to Bail: The ‘Paulson Put,’ 
Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown, 38 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 3, 22 
(2009), available at http://www.newdeal20.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/paulson-
put.pdf. 
 104. See id. at 18. 
 105. See Jane D’Arista & Korkut Erturk, The Monetary Explanation of the Crisis 
and the Ongoing Threat to the Global Economy, 53 CHALLENGE 5, 18 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.challengemagazine.com/extra/005_029.pdf. 
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tract.  No longer would wages, taxes, or regulations increase.106  In a 
1981 speech in Kansas, Volcker explained the changes he sought.107  
First, he derided the economists of the 1950s and 1960s as “social phi-
losopher[s].”108  That era, he explained, in which economists who 
sought a “little inflation” to avoid “[s]ocial conflict over the exact size 
of each group’s slice of the national pie . . . . by giving everyone a little 
extra in nominal income,” was over.109  The Fair Deal era of high and 
increasing wages was premised, he thought, on a “game of mirrors,” 
and it had crippled productivity growth.110 
As he put it, “[t]axes are themselves an element in costs, and high 
tax rates impair incentives . . . .  [F]rom the standpoint of economic 
policy, the best way—and the only realistic way—to reduce the defi-
cit is to cut expenditures . . . .”111  Moreover, he argued, “further large 
budget cuts will be required in future years to make room for the tax 
reductions that we need.”112  In terms of regulatory policies, he made 
it clear that the consumer and environmental movements had hit their 
limits: “We simply cannot afford regulatory or other policies that in-
hibit competition, add unnecessarily to costs or prices, or excessively 
shelter some groups from economic risks of their own making.”113 
Volcker diagnosed the problem of inflation as tied to increasing 
wages, using the high wage industry of automakers as his example.  
The difficulties of that industry were not quality of the product, but 
“related in a significant degree to wage and cost pressures building 
over a number of years.”114  And, “[i]f inflation is to be unwound, and 
our industry is to restore full competitiveness and provide high levels 
of employment, private behavior in wage bargaining . . . will need to 
reflect the new realities of the marketplace.”115  Volcker kept interest 
rates so high that he even angered Reagan White House officials.116  
 
 106. Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at Kansas State Uni-
versity Alfred M. Landon Lecture Series on Public Issues: Dealing with Inflation: 
Obstacles and Opportunities (Apr. 15, 1981), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 
docs/historical/volcker/Volcker_19810415.pdf. 
 107. See id.  
 108. Id. at 3.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 7.   
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 8.   
 114. Id. at 10 
 115. Id. at 11.   
 116. WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
RUNS THE COUNTRY 430 (1989). 
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As Bill Greider noted in Secrets of the Temple, Volcker would rebut 
their excessive optimism on inflation and pull “out his card on union 
wages” and note that inflation would not come down permanently un-
til labor “got the message and surrendered.”117 
Globalization and labor arbitrage was also on the menu.  Volcker 
said in one speech, “the case for ‘free trade’ depends not just on ab-
stract propositions of comparative advantage and long-run increases 
in national income, but on the advantages, here and now, in reinforc-
ing pressures toward price stability.”118  In fact, one 2001 study of 
Federal Open Market Committee minutes by Charles L. Weise posit-
ed that the Fed did not respond to any pressure group except the 
AFL-CIO, and in that case, the data implied that the “Fed purposely 
[took] a position opposite to that advocated by the AFL-CIO.”119 
Labor got the message and surrendered.  Striking disappeared 
from the American economic scene after 1980.  Volcker’s plan for the 
Federal Reserve was to slam on the brakes, hard.  From 1979 onward, 
interest rates jumped up to nineteen percent.  A brutal recession fol-
lowed in 1981, the longest and deepest in post-war history up to that 
point.120  Unions were decimated and did not recover during the re-
covery period.121  America fell into recession as a unionized nation 
and recovered into a non-unionized Wall Street boom.  Wages, which 
had not increased in real terms since 1973, stayed stagnant.122 
Consumption, however, did not decline.123  Americans began shift-
ing their financial posture from liquid savers with pensions, savings, 
and home equity into debtors with 401Ks, credit cards, and second 
mortgages.124  Policy became far more creditor friendly, from the 1978 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Volcker, supra note 106, at 12.   
 119. Charles L. Weise, Private Sector Influences on Monetary Policy in the United 
States, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 449 (2008), available at http://www.gettys 
burg.edu/academics/economics/char_weisehomepage/completepapertoJMCB11-
01.pdf. 
 120. See FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 24, at 136–37. 
 121. See id. at 137. 
 122. See David Cay Johnston, Is Our Tax System Helping Us Create Wealth?, TAX 
ANALYSTS (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/is_our_tax_ 
system_helping_us_create_wealth.pdf (“For most workers, [wages] fell. Wages 
peaked way back in 1972–1973, were on a mostly flat trajectory for more than two 
decades, rose briefly in the late 1990s, and then fell sharply in the new century.”). 
 123. See Personal Consumption Expenditures, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PCE (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).  
 124. See generally Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry, 
FRONTLINE (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/ 
more/rise.html (documenting the drastic rise in credit card spending in the 1980s). 
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Marquette Supreme Court decision that lifted usury caps to tightened 
bankruptcy laws enhancing the rights of lenders to financial deregula-
tion allowing the securitization of mortgages and subprime lending.125 
Unlike the curtailed social programs of the New Deal, the housing 
finance complex continued to expand in the Reagan era.  Fannie 
Mae, by now a private corporation with a government guarantee, be-
came a political slush fund for the emerging right-wing “New Demo-
crat” consensus.126  Lower income groups, which had very little influ-
ence in an era of declining social spending, easily adopted this new 
credit-friendly consensus.  As an example, the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition had as its motto: “Access to credit and capital 
is a basic civil right.”127  Thus formed a new political machine, with 
Wall Street pouring money into politics, liberal Democrats and con-
servative Republicans both seeking the liberalization of lending 
standards, and funded community groups seeking to bring more cred-
it to under-served communities.  The most obvious signpost of hous-
ing’s import was that in the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the mortgage in-
terest tax deduction was preserved, while the tax deduction for all 
other kinds of consumer debt was eliminated.128 
In the 1980s, household financial obligations gradually increased 
even as interest rates fell.  The American consumer was levering up, 
even by the official statistics. 
 
 
 125. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 
299 (1978); Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Cred-
it Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, FDIC DIV. INS. 
BANK TRENDS (Mar. 1998), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt_9805.html 
[hereinafter Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest]. 
 126. See Ferguson & Johnson, supra note 103, at 4.   
 127. Building Healthy Communities: Community Reinvestment Act and the Fi-
nancial Modernization Movement, LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS & 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND 27, http://www.protectcivilrights.org/ 
pdf/reports/healthy_communities/cra_report_chapters.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 128. Eric Toder et al., Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction, TAX POLICY 
CTR. (Apr. 2010), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412099-mortgage-
deduction-reform.pdf. 
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Figure 2. Household Financial Obligations as a Percent of Disposable Personal In-
come; Effective Federal Funds Rate129 
 
 
The transformation of the American polity away from a high trust 
culture with high savings, productivity sharing between corporations 
and workers, social and educational programs based on a well-funded 
tax base, and a housing system supporting this structure was complete 
by the early 2000s.130  Financial asset growth replaced wage growth, 
and falling interest rates allowed for stock market holdings, and then 
housing, to become a leverage point masking the deterioration in the 
financial status of the American citizenry.131 
 
 129. Data obtained with permission from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Eco-
nomic Research, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org (last 
visited June 18, 2012). 
 130. See generally Tim Noah, The United States of Inequality, SLATE (Sept. 3, 
2010, 3:06 PM) http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_great_divergence 
/features/2010/the_united_states_of_inequality/introducing_the_great_divergence.ht
ml; ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP 22–32 
(2003) (discussing the transformation of the housing market into the playing field for 
a bidding war for the smaller and smaller pool of homes near good educational sys-
tems). 
 131. See Josh Rosner, Housing in the New Millennium: A Home Without Equity 
Is Just a Rental with Debt, GRAHAM FISHER (June 29, 2001), http://www.institutmont 
aigne.org/medias/documents/06-29-01%20Home%20Without%20Equity%20is%20a 
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By the 2000s, a primary driver of consumer spending growth was 
mortgage equity withdrawals, which supplied up to nine percent of 
disposable income.132  American women went to work.133  Then 
Americans drew down their savings and took out credit cards.134  Fi-
nally, they liquidated their financial assets, including their home equi-
ty.135 
In this system, a homeowner still received a home in which to live, 
which was also a savings vehicle.136  But there was a significant differ-
ence in terms of what a family received.  Unlike the home equity 
model of the high trust era, the equity in the home was liquid.137  A 
homeowner could withdraw his equity not after a thirty-year career, 
but at any point.138  He could also withdraw equity based on excessive 
housing appreciation inconsistent with economic fundamentals, trans-
forming wealth accumulation from a steady progressive widening of 
the fruits of the economy into a lottery ticket.  Schooling costs were 
still linked to property tax values, but the growth of private schools in 
the 1970s began to undercut the perceived value of a public school 
system.139  Homeowners had more options for schooling their children 
with less of a common obligation to ensure that common infrastruc-
ture fulfilled its goal. 
In the arena of political representation, the social contract also 
shifted.  A homeowner could vote, but with far more money in poli-
tics, politicians were increasingly responsive to the needs of upper in-
 
%20Rental%20.pdf (discussing structural changes in the housing market to mask 
poor underwriting standards); see also Johnston, supra note 122 (discussing financial 
weakness in the form of stagnating and then declining wages). 
 132. Alan Greenspan & James Kennedy, Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted 
from Homes 45 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Div. of Research & Statistics & Monetary Affairs, 
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2007-20, 2007), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200720/200720pap.pdf. 
 133. See, e.g., Robert Reich, The Truth About the American Economy, ROBERT 
REICH (May 30, 2011), http://robertreich.org/post/5993482080. 
 134. See, e.g., Daryl G. Jones, Personal Savings Rate: Worse than We Thought, 
CNN MONEY (June 30, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/30/news/economy/per 
sonal_savings_decline.fortune/index.htm; Stein, supra note 122. 
 135. Robert Reich, The Most Important Speech of His Presidency, ROBERT REICH 
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://robertreich.org/post/13852130536. 
 136. GRETCHEN MORGENSON & JOSH ROSNER, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT: HOW 
OUTSIZED AMBITION, GREED, AND CORRUPTION LED TO ECONOMIC ARMAGEDDON 
222 (2011). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 223.   
 139. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 130, at 22–28. 
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come donors.140  The collapse of unions as a political force accelerated 
the lack of political representation in the economy for most middle-
income homeowners.141  Pensions declined in importance, and mili-
tary service waned in the face of a volunteer armed service.142  Home-
owners no longer banked with a reliable institution, but they did re-
ceive far more credit in the form of home equity lines, student loans, 
and credit cards.143  In return for all of this, a homeowner paid taxes 
and obeyed the law.  Cultural bonds frayed, and society became more 
litigious.144  Societal norms were enforced through a coercive frame.  
Bankruptcy laws tightened, the prison system expanded dramatically, 
and employment became tied to metrics such as credit reporting 
scores.145 
The banking system changed as well.  The Savings and Loan indus-
try crafted by the New Deal era fell apart under high interest rates, 
money market funds, and deregulation.146  Mortgage financing moved 
to securitization, the shadow banking sector, and nonbank originators 
of home mortgages.147  The fundamental change in the banking sys-
tem was that control of credit creation passed from public to private 
entities.  As Jane D’Arista notes: “By year-end 2001 . . . reserve bal-
ances had shrunk to 0.2 percent of deposits and banks’ share of total 
 
 140. LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
NEW GILDED AGE 252–65 (2010). 
 141. See FERGUSON & ROGERS, supra note 24 (discussing the political consequence 
of the early 1980s collapse of organized labor density in the workforce and its impact 
on the 1984 Presidential election). 
 142. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES: MILITARY 
SERVICE 198 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/ 
censusatlas/pdf/12_Military-Service.pdf. 
 143. Revolving credit jumped 18-fold between 1980 and 2006, from roughly $50 
billion in 1980 to roughly $900 billion in 2006. Historical Data: Consumer Credit Out-
standing, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ 
g19/HIST/cc_hist_r.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 144. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND RE-
VIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 146–47 (2001) (attributing the sudden reliance on 
lawyers and formal institutions at the end of the twentieth century, in part, to growth 
in the number of legal professionals and “preventive lawyering”). 
 145. For information on bankruptcy law changes and their impacts, see Ellis, The 
Effect of Consumer Interest, supra note 125.  For prison statistics, see MICHELLE AL-
EXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLIND-
NESS 218–19 (2010). 
 146. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings & Loans Crisis: Truth 
and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 26 (2000), available at http://fcx.fdic. 
gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf (“From January 1, 1986, through 
year-end 1995, the number of federally insured thrift institutions in the United States 
declined from 3,234 to 1,645, or by approximately 50 percent.”). 
 147. MADRICK, supra note 71, at 351–70.   
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financial assets and liabilities had fallen to less than half that of the 
1950s.”148  This meant that interest rate moves became ineffective, al-
lowing private banks to innovate around the sclerotic central bank.  
Longer, slower recoveries were the result of a breakdown in mone-
tary tools.  The political consensus underlying this economic order is a 
support of a shadow banking system controlled by large banks.149 
D. The Twenty-First Century Housing Collapse 
The Reagan paradigm of credit growth substituted for wage growth 
eventually ran out of space.  Economist Thomas Palley noted that 
debt-fueled growth presented policy-makers with a paradox: 
America’s economic contradictions are part of a new business cycle 
that has emerged since 1980. The business cycles of Presidents 
Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. 
Bush share strong similarities and are different from pre-1980 cycles. 
The similarities are large trade deficits, manufacturing job loss, asset 
price inflation, rising debt-to-income ratios, and detachment of wag-
es from productivity growth. The new cycle rests on financial booms 
and cheap imports. Financial booms provide collateral that supports 
debt-financed spending. Borrowing is also supported by an easing of 
credit standards and new financial products that increase leverage 
and widen the range of assets that can be borrowed against. Cheap 
imports ameliorate the effects of wage stagnation.150 
While the housing boom led to growth in construction, much of the 
financing activity by the late 2000s financed second homes, invest-
ment properties, and mortgage equity withdrawals.151  By 2006, finan-
cial services industry participants had created a product, the synthetic 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO), that allowed the trading of 
housing finance paper without the housing.152  Traders could effec-
 
 148. D’Arista, supra note 85, at 11.   
 149. Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC (May 2009), http://www.theatlan 
tic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/7364. 
 150. Thomas I. Palley, The Debt Delusion, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 8, 2008), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-debt-delusion. 
 151. Andrew Haughwout et al., Real Estate Investors, the Leverage Cycle, and the 
Housing Market Crisis 32 (Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 514, Sept. 
2011), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr514.pdf; Q3 
2011: Mortgage Equity Withdrawal Strongly Negative, CALCULATEDRISK (Dec. 19, 
2011, 12:59 PM), http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2011/12/q3-2011-mortgage-
equity-withdrawal.html. For a discussion of increasing leverage due to second mort-
gages, see MORGENSON & ROSNER, supra, note 136, at 219–37. 
 152. See BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE 
HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 78–79 (2010). 
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tively bet on the same house an infinite number of times.  The securit-
ization chain was driven by the logic of speed, routinely violating local 
property record-keeping requirements and pooling and servicing 
agreements that secured collateral.153  Wall Street banks were misrep-
resenting the quality of loans, lending to people who could not pay it 
back, and propping up industries whose model was regulatory arbi-
trage: credit default swaps, private mortgage insurance, and credit rat-
ings agencies.154 
The system collapsed, and roughly six trillion dollars left home-
owners’ balance sheets.155  The Obama administration implemented a 
strategy of rescuing the financial sector while also pursuing policies to 
help the homeowner that would not conflict with the interests of the 
financial sector.  These included extending the first time homebuyer 
tax credit, nationalizing Fannie and Freddie and engaging in unprece-
dented Federal Reserve intervention in the secondary mortgage mar-
ket,156 backstopping nearly one-hundred percent of the mortgage 
market,157 extending credit from the Federal Home Loan bank sys-
tem,158 and promising seventy-five billion dollars in assistance through 
the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).159 
Corporate profits responded, but homeowner equity did not. The 
Wall Street-builder-homeowner coalition was broken. 
 
 
 153. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 6–10 
(2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
 154. Id. at xxii, xxiv–xxv, 212, 225. 
 155. Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings, Fourth 
Quarter 2011, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYSTEM 106 (Mar. 8, 2012), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf. 
 156. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
Stat. 2654 (2008).  
 157. Nick Timiraos, U.S. Role in Mortgage Market Grows Even Larger, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 30, 2010, 7:46 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870409320 
4575216530213580458.html (“Government-related entities backed 96.5% of all home 
loans during the first quarter, up from 90% in 2009, according to Inside Mortgage Fi-
nance. The increase was driven by a jump in the share of loans backed by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, the government-owned housing-finance giants.”). 
 158. See generally Ferguson & Johnson, supra note 103. 
 159. See Stoller, supra note 21.   
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II.  REASSESSING THE HOUSING MARKET: THE COMING OF A 
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 
A. The Failed Policy Response 
It is far easier to understand the roots of the current policy morass 
in this context.  The neoliberal policy framework has deep political 
strength, as its political funding and power is supplied and organized 
by large sell-side banks.  As long as there was alignment between the-
se banks and the voting home-owning public—alignment supplied by 
increasing leverage in both spheres—there was equilibrium.  What-
ever else is true about the beliefs of elite actors in both parties, they 
believe in this alignment.160 
The obvious precedent of the 1933 FDR-style break with the credi-
tor relationships of the previous decade was considered and discard-
ed.  In a little-noticed interview in 2010, Obama criticized Roosevelt’s 
sharp discontinuity with Hoover’s policy framework, calling the polit-
ical architect of the New Deal “irresponsible” for handling the bank 
runs of the 1930s with a restructuring over a bank holiday (which 
Obama did not do when faced with a similar bank run in the money 
markets).161  Obama then reflected on the failure of his administra-
tion’s HAMP program, noting sadly, “this is a multitrillion-dollar 
problem . . . .  [W]e’ve got only so much gravel and we’ve got a really 
big pothole.”162  Senior Obama advisor Jared Bernstein noted that 
even at the height of the recession there was no appetite for public 
works-style programs to create jobs in the administration.163  Finally, 
Obama retained a key contingent of the Bush economic team—
Bernanke and Geithner were both key architects of the bailouts.164  
 
 160. See Theresa Tedesco, The Great Solvent North, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at 
A23.  This is inferred from recent adulation of political and economic elites lavish on 
the Canadian banking system, which is composed of a small number of extremely 
large banks.   
 161. Roundtable Interview of the President with Bloggers, ESCHATON BLOG (Oct. 
27, 2010), http://www.eschatonblog.com/2010/10/my-day.html. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Jared Bernstein, Shoulds Versus Coulds, ON THE ECONOMY: FACTS, 
THOUGHTS, & COMMENTARY BY JARED BERNSTEIN (May 30, 2011), http://jaredbern 
steinblog.com/shoulds-versus-coulds. 
 164. See Ferguson & Johnson, supra note 103, at 4. 
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Even Neil Kashkari,165 Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) 
Chief under Bush, continued under Obama.166 
President Obama has also spoken fondly of the status quo of exist-
ing megabanks, praising the leaders of both JP Morgan and Goldman 
Sachs, justifying the reach of these institutions by appealing to the ex-
ample of the Canadian system of concentrated financial systems.167  
Larry Summers, Obama’s Chief Economic advisor in 2010, claimed 
that smaller institutions are far more destabilizing than large institu-
tions.168  Throughout the Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama 
administrations, there developed a consensus towards universal 
megabanking and private credit control.  This consensus is embedded 
in the large regulatory banking agencies, Congress, implicitly in the 
economics profession, and indeed, in the Obama White House. 
Various administration officials, such as Larry Summers and Jared 
Bernstein, have argued that the Obama administration’s policy re-
sponse to the foreclosure situation would be far better but for politi-
cal constraints.169  Bernstein noted that a “serious program of mort-
gage modifications” would provoke a fierce political reaction.170  But 
forcing mortgage modifications would not have provoked such a po-
litical reaction in late 2008 when the financial system was on its 
deathbed.  Congressional Democrats proposed including bankruptcy 
modification provisions in the $700 billion TARP to allow those in 
bankruptcy to renegotiate their mortgages.171  Then-Senator Obama 
whipped his own party in 2008 to support the TARP bill without such 
a provision (though the bill did include liquid coal and solar subsi-
 
 165. See Heidi N. Moore, Meet Ned Kashkari: The Man with the $700 Billion Wal-
let, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2008, 11:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/10/06/meet-
neel-kashkari-the-man-with-the-700-billion-wallet. 
 166. Heidi N. Moore, Will Obama Pick a New $700 Billion Man? Not Yet, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2009, 11:41 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/02/25/neel-kashkari-
treasurys-700-billion-man-still-employed. 
 167. See David Leonhardt, After the Great Recession, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 
(Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/03/magazine/03Obama-t.html?part 
ner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all. 
 168. Shahien Nasiripour, Larry Summers Defends Megabanks, Says Too Many 
Small Banks Make U.S. ‘Less Stable’, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2010, 6:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/23/larry-summers-defends-meg_n_549574. 
html. 
 169. See Bernstein, supra note 163; E. Scott Reckard & Peter Hong, Banks Slow to 
Modify Mortgages, Treasury Reports, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2009), http://articles.la 
times.com/2009/aug/05/business/fi-loans5. 
 170. Bernstein, supra note 163. 
 171. Edmund L. Andrews, Housing Experts Say Ballot Proposal May Do Little for 
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A22. 
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dies).172  In fact, he committed to passing a “cramdown” provision in 
order to secure the vote of Congresswoman Donna Edwards, but re-
neged on the deal.173  Obama then later refused to put the cramdown 
provision in the stimulus and watched passively as the Democratic 
Senate caucus decided that the bill could not pass.174 
During the first era of homeownership—from the New Deal to 
roughly the 1970s—housing was correlated with income growth.  In 
the Reagan era, neoliberals in both parties substituted debt and asset 
inflation of housing for wage growth; as long as asset prices remained 
high, the housing coalition could be sustained.  The housing crisis has 
ended the political unity behind the homeownership coalition, sepa-
rating the interests of Wall Street from the construction industry and 
the public at large. 
The Obama administration is operating as if there is still a political 
alignment between homeowners and finance.  Thus, Obama’s strate-
gy, while supporting the banking system, seems weak and unable to 
deliver tangible benefits for homeowners.  But rescuing the banking 
system and inflating asset values, while it delivered financial benefits 
to a broad base in earlier periods, no longer works to deliver anything 
to the public at large.  The Reagan-era model of piling debt on con-
sumers has reached its endpoint. 
The foreclosure crisis is the area where this strategy is most obvi-
ously falling short and creating a legacy of wealth destruction.  The 
economics of a foreclosure are well known, so from an efficiency 
standpoint, the policies of the Obama administration make no sense.  
Every foreclosure is costly to the homeowner, the community, and 
the lender.  A locality loses roughly $30,000 in lost tax revenue and 
vacant property costs, the homeowner loses his or her home, the val-
ue of the home drops substantially, and houses in the community de-
cline in value.175  Foreclosures reduce fixed residential investment, 
which is already at a post-World War II record low percentage of 
 
 172. See Michael Cooper & Jeff Zeleny, Both Obama and McCain Make Push for 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A24. 
 173. See David Dayen, Pro Publica Advances Narrative on How Obama Killed 
Cramdown, FDL NEWS DESK (Feb. 4, 2011), http://news.firedoglake.com/2011/02/04/ 
pro-publica-advances-narrative-on-how-obama-killed-cramdown; Matt Stoller, Don-
na Edwards and Her Concession from Obama on Bankruptcy, OPEN LEFT (Oct. 3, 
2008, 5:26 PM), http://openleft.com/diary/8815. 
 174. See Cyra Master, Dems Agree ‘Cram Down’ Bill Will Not Be in Stimulus, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/01/dems-
agree-cram-down-bill-will-not-be-in-stimulus/132. 
 175. Mike Konczal, The Cost of a Foreclosure, RORTYBOMB (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/the-cost-of-a-foreclosure. 
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GDP, and they reduce auto sales.176  This increases unemployment, 
accelerated deflationary housing trends, and causes political problems 
for an administration whose electoral weakness is clearly the econo-
my.  Moreover, the housing crisis is confiscating the largest store of 
broad-based wealth held by American families.  Home equity has 
dropped to 38.6% of the value of homeowner held real estate, the 
lowest percentage since the 1920s.177  Seven trillion dollars is gone 
from household balance sheets.178 
This path of negligence is happening despite options to intervene.  
There are clear examples of how to handle too much debt so as to re-
store healthy credit relationships.  There are also legal tools.  The 
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offer enormous lati-
tude for action for loans backed by government sponsored enterpris-
es.179  Even in the private mortgage-backed security market, signifi-
cant legal problems with foreclosure paperwork done through 
securitization and the resulting widespread fraud suggest that the 
range of action is not constrained by Congressional pressure.180  The 
administration and both houses of Congress have made consistent 
sets of choices to create an atmosphere conducive to foreclosures.181 
Moral hazard is also a poor explanation for elite policy choices.  
Clearly, both the Bush and Obama administrations have been willing 
to offer financing and subsidies to large financial institutions.182  Un-
 
 176. Atif Mian et al., Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy 35 tbl.1, 
36 tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16685, 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722195. 
 177. Q2 Flow of Funds: Household Real Estate Assets Off $6.6 Trillion from Peak, 
CALCULATEDRISK, (Sept. 16, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/ 
2011/09/q2-flow-of-funds-household-real-estate.html. 
 178. Carrie Bay, Foreclosure Woes to Plague Industry for at Least Five Years: 
Survey, DSNEWS.COM (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/foreclosure-
woes-to-plague-industry-for-at-least-five-years-survey-2011-10-03 (“Data from 
the Federal Reserve shows that between 2005 and mid-2011, Americans lost $7 tril-
lion in home equity.”).  
 179. David Dayen, Warren: FHFA Must Help with Principal Write-Downs, FDL 
NEWS DESK (Feb. 9, 2012, 8:55 AM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/08/warren-
fhfa-must-help-with-principal-write-downs. 
 180. See Complaint, United States v. Bank of America, (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2012) 
1:12-cv-00361-RMC, available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Complaint_ 
Corrected_2012-03-14.pdf.  
 181. Stoller, supra note 173.   
 182. See DEAN BAKER & TRAVIS MCARTHUR, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLI-
CY RESEARCH, THE VALUE OF THE “TOO BIG TO FAIL” BIG BANK SUBSIDY (Sept. 
2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-
09.pdf; see also Cooper & Zeleny, supra note 172; Ferguson & Johnson, supra note 
103. 
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popularity does not work as an explanation either.  At first, subsidies 
to the financial sector took the form of “shadow bailouts,” but in-
creasingly the bailouts became explicit through the Federal Reserve 
and finally through the Congressional appropriations procedure.183  
These were extremely unpopular measures, and remain so.184  Yet 
neither administration attempted to address problematic political 
blowback from these measures, such as clawing back outrageous AIG 
bonuses185 or purchasing equity from the banks at levels equivalent to 
private investors such as Warren Buffett.186 
A better explanation is that the Bush administration, and then the 
Obama administration, relied on a functional New Deal era housing 
system around which to orient both their economic and political 
strategies.  This system no longer exists, and there is as of yet no re-
placement. 
B. Why Housing Cannot “Recover” 
The financial, housing, and foreclosure crises have snapped the 
spine of an implicit American national strategy, one that tightly 
linked homeownership, political citizenship, and elite management of 
the economy.  The implication of this thesis is that the policy goal of 
“a recovery” of the housing market, or a simple mitigation of foreclo-
sure problems, overlooks the deeper structural problems implicit in 
our national industrial policy.  Indeed, the reason the massive mone-
tary and fiscal government interventions in the economy have failed 
to generate a robust recovery is because of a lack of consensus of 
what that recovery is supposed to do and how to restructure the credit 
creation system. 
Attempts to recreate prior solutions to our current policy dilemmas 
run up against a fundamental structural problem—the lack of an in-
stitutional apparatus to build a sustainable credit model based on 
shared prosperity.  We see this most obviously in the transfer of bank-
ing power from public institutions to private globe-spanning banks, 
but it is not what exists that is most problematic, it is what does not.  
The Obama administration and its allies in the Federal Reserve and 
 
 183. Ferguson & Johnson, supra note 103, at 24.   
 184. See id. at 7. 
 185. See AIG Bonuses in 2010 Total $100 Million, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 
2010, 11:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/03/aig-bonuses-in-2010-
total_n_447025.html. 
 186. Barry Ritholtz, Bungling the Bank Bailout, BIG PICTURE (Jan. 10, 2009, 11:30 
AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/01/bungling-the-bank-bailout. 
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various regulatory agencies have pursued an aggressive strategy to re-
store the prior credit creation system, but the housing crash has 
caused such a strategy to deliver significant benefits to the economic 
elites and no one else, as there is no mechanism to deliver broadly 
shared gains.187  Political instability is the result. 
The current intellectual and policy consensus is to attempt to re-
construct a particular social order: the Reagan-era social contract in 
which the democratization of credit and the widening of financial as-
set ownership across the broad base of the population offset male 
wage stagnation.188  This strategy avoided labor conflict by breaking 
unions while substituting debt for wage gains.  Housing was one sig-
nificant leverage point of the system.  Innovations in housing finance 
drove much Wall Street activity and profits from 1980 onward, and 
gains in housing values represented the primary source of economic 
gain for most Americans during this time.189  During the recession of 
the early 2000s, residential fixed investment prevented a deep reces-
sion.190  By 2001, housing, though it had always led economic recover-
ies, had become the national regulator of economic activity, aligning 
elites who wanted to avoid a recession, homeowners, builders, and fi-
nancial market players.191  Mortgage equity withdrawals actually 
drove some part of consumer spending.192 
Throughout this time period, the interests of elites and the public, 
through housing, had a degree of unity.  While this system concen-
trated financial gains among elites, gains were real enough in the 
population at large to sustain political legitimacy.  Implicit in this 
strategy is that private actors play a dominant role in the management 
of the credit creation process, and that the state’s power to serve as a 
check on these interests recedes.  New Deal era restrictions on fi-
nance were deregulated both domestically and internationally, but 
housing was broadly available and wealth creation happened among 
 
 187. See generally Dudley, supra note 102.  
 188. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 189. See Jonathan McCarthy & Charles Steindel, Housing Activity and Consumer 
Spending 2 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://nyfedecono 
mists.org/mccarthy/Housing_Activity_and_Consumer_Spending.pdf. 
 190. See id. (“Although the recent growth rate of residential investment has not 
been unusual, the level of housing market activity has been extraordinary.  This re-
flects the fact that the recent expansion of residential investment has occurred with-
out a significant bust preceding it.”) 
 191. See Paul Krugman, Dubya’s Double Dip?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2002), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2002/08/02/opinion/dubya-s-double-dip.html. 
 192. Brian Blackstone, Greenspan Sees Spending Link to Home Equity, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 24, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117734315504079111.html.  
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the voting public at large, as well as among financial elites.  This is the 
coalition that Bush, and then Obama, sought to rebuild.  It is the coa-
lition that President Bill Clinton used to sustain economic growth 
during his presidency.  There is too much debt piled on the American 
consumer, however, to allow debt-fueled aggregate demand expan-
sion, and re-mediating the foreclosure situation would require a radi-
cal shift in philosophy.  It would require acknowledging that the state 
can and should serve as a check on private financial interests. Instead 
of stopping foreclosures, the Obama administration has acceded to 
the wishes of a financial system that no longer offers anything to or-
dinary Americans.  It has even gone as far as subordinating the sys-
tem of laws governing credit relationships to preserve the existing 
privately mediated credit system.193 
The problem is thus twofold.  It is critical to build a political and in-
tellectual apparatus with the capacity to break with existing creditor 
relationships, as the Roosevelt administration did (and as has been 
done before, during the Latin American debt crisis using “Brady 
bonds” to deal with a debtor cartel, and during the Swedish banking 
crisis of the early 1990s).194  It is also necessary to figure out how the 
twenty-first century American polity will distribute wealth.  How does 
one construct new institutions based on modern technical and cultural 
capabilities and as well as pressing resource constraints?  The subur-
ban model of regimented schooling, television as the key information 
distributor, and cheap oil as the main energy source must be replaced 
with something else. 
C. The Coming Breakdown 
[W]here conformity to a society’s institutions is secured primari-
ly through governmental coercion or privately deployed sanctions, 
the resource costs may be substantial.  Examples include some au-
thoritarian political systems, colonial regimes, and as we will see, 
highly unequal capitalist economies. 
Samuel Bowles and Arjun Jayadev, 2005, “Guard Labor”195 
 
 193. See YVES SMITH, ECONNED: HOW UNENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST UNDER-
MINED DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTED CAPITALISM 270–305 (2010). 
 194. See Michael Gavin & Ricardo Hausmann, The Roots of Banking Crises: The 
Macroeconomic Context 9–10 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Office of the Chief Economist, 
Working Paper No. 318, 1998), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rhausma/ 
WP/pubWP-318.pdf.  
 195. Samuel Bowles & Arjun Jayadev, Guard Labor: An Essay in Honor of Pranab 
Bardhan 7 (Univ. Mass. Amherst Political Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 
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Fundamentally, the mortgage crisis has revealed that housing is no 
longer a proxy for wealth. Debt is not increasing, and neither are 
wages.  Housing is no longer a savings vehicle, since assets are drop-
ping and not increasing in value.  And the thirty-year fixed mortgage 
may no longer make sense as a product.  Careers are unstable,196 and 
oil is no longer cheap.197  States and localities will need to find sources 
of financing other than property values. 
The Reagan era social contract—stagnant wages with higher credit 
availability—is on the verge of ending.  Rather than wage stagnation, 
Americans face wage cuts.  The average American was forty-five per-
cent poorer in 2009 than in 2007, with median income having fallen 
roughly ten percent over that time.198  Debt loads have come down 
slightly but are still quite high.199  And housing is frozen, no longer a 
driver of growth, social stability, and monetary control.200  Housing 
was first de-linked from wealth during the Reagan era, but it was still 
associated with global willingness to supply credit (and oil) to Ameri-
can consumers.  Now there is no way to measure American wealth, no 
monetary proxy.  Instead, creditors are rationally attempting to liqui-
date anything of value, whether that be housing, public infrastructure, 
or mineral wealth.201 
 
90, 2004), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/wor 
king_papers_51-100/WP90.pdf. 
 196. See Phyllis Korkki, The Shifting Definition of Worker Loyalty, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 2011, at B08. 
 197. See Oil Price History and Analysis, WTRG ECONOMICS, http://www.wtrg.com/ 
prices.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 198. Jesse Bricker et al., Surveying the Aftermath of the Storm: Changes in Family 
Finances from 2007 to 2009 25 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, 
Working Paper No. 2011-17, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
feds/2011/201117/201117pap.pdf. 
 199. See generally Charles Roxburgh et. al., Debt and Deleveraging: Uneven Pro-
gress on the Path to Growth, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Financial_Markets/Uneven_progre
ss_on_the_path_to_growth (“Debt in the financial sector relative to GDP has fallen 
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any other country.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 102. 
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FORBES (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2012/03/29/ 
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This lack of consensus among elites is often taken for an increase in 
divisiveness.  Elites are currently panicking and bemoaning a “lack of 
bipartisanship” in making political decisions.202  Yet the bipartisan-
ship for which they nostalgically yearn is actually a reflection of the 
underlying economic logic and profitability of the New Deal era and 
the later securitization financial models.  Higher wages kept an egali-
tarian social contract in place, then higher debts with stagnant wages 
kept a more unequal social contract in place.203  But there is no model 
social contract for deflation in the main asset class held by the broad-
est number of Americans combined with stagnant or even declining 
real wages. 
Reconstructing a stable social contract in a period of chaos is an 
ugly process and often comes only after a war or some sort of system-
ic collapse.204  Ideally, successful political and intellectual organizing 
can align enough elite economic actors with the public interest so as 
to preclude catastrophic damage.  So far, this does not appear to be 
happening. 
Alongside policy paralysis is an increasingly bitter series of con-
flicts within and outside the formal political system.  The state is sub-
stituting authoritarian technologies, techniques, and legal tools for 
traditional mechanisms for mediating conflict, namely social spending 
through the private or public sectors.205  And the public is increasingly 
embittered.  Labor protests in Wisconsin (matched in several other 
Midwestern states) were historically large and paralleled the Citizens 
United Supreme Court decision formalizing corporate control over 
the political system.206  Occupy Wall Street protests have expanded 
 
 202. Consider the formation of groups such as Unity 08, No Labels and Americans 
Elect, multi-million dollar entities dedicated to ending partisan rancor. 
 203. The most obvious indication of Reagan’s creation of a social contract was 
Barack Obama’s laudatory comments towards Reagan for generating a new kind of 
transformative politics. See Jonathan Weiler, President Obama, Ronald Regan, and 
Our Fraying Social Contract, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2010), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-weiler/president-obama-ronald-re_b_620061.html. 
 204. Both the Treaty of Versailles and the Bretton Woods Conference reorganized 
the global monetary order and emerged after World Wars.  FDR implemented much 
of the New Deal legislation in the first hundred days during a banking crisis. See 
ROBERT CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON (2002).  
The strategy to implement the Great Society was crafted immediately after JFK’s as-
sassination. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: RISE OF DISASTER 
CAPITALISM (2007). 
 205. Bowles & Jayadev, supra note 195, at 7. 
 206. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 376 (2010); see, e.g., 
Robert Barnes, Two Justices Suggest Citizens United Ruling Should Be Reconsid-
ered in Montana Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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this unrest nationally.207  Higher labor unrest matches higher levels of 
government and private corporate surveillance by local officials.208  
New laws criminalizing the videotaping of police officers in public 
places (subsequently ruled unconstitutional),209 the increasing scope 
of the national security state,210 a reconstitution of debtor’s prisons, 
aggressive and innovative debt collection techniques,211 tax farming 
by private actors,212 and the use of credit reporting for employment 
and national security clearance purposes213 are constructing the scaf-
folding for a creditor-dominated state. 
Attempts to restructure credit relationships through the political 
process are being met with explicit restrictions on voting rights.  The 
second iteration of the Tea Party movement was sparked by a speech 
from financial commentator Rick Santelli on CNBC complaining 
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about moral hazard and bailouts of homeowners.214  There are cur-
rently Republican politicians passing laws that disenfranchise the 
poor, minorities, and the young, in a replay of Jim Crow re-
strictions.215  There are conservative politicians arguing that voting 
rights should again be restricted to those who own property.216 
Creditors are also beginning to govern outright.  The Obama ad-
ministration and leaders of both parties are encouraging foreign sov-
ereign wealth funds to invest in public infrastructure, such as roads, 
medical services, schools, turnpikes, airports, prisons, bridges, ports, 
hospitals, parking garages, water and sewer plants, and energy as-
sets.217  The House Transportation Committee is considering the pri-
vatization of Amtrak.218  Goldman Sachs, in a recent 10-K filing, ex-
pressed interest in public “distressed assets” but warned that there 
were reputational risks associated with managing them.219  Chicago, 
for instance, has sold its parking meters to a consortium led by Mor-
gan Stanley; now the city cannot hold street fairs or design bus or bike 
lanes without permission and compensation.220 
Political actors are also assaulting overtime pay, the forty-hour 
workweek, and even child labor restrictions.221  Drug testing for un-
employment benefits is being introduced as a proposal across the 
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country222 and class action lawsuits have been curtailed by the 2010–
2011 Supreme Court term.223  The fundamental ability of the state to 
constrain the actions of private, powerful interests is gone, so those 
interests are now governing with an extremist bias towards creditors. 
This is not a sustainable model of governance.  As the social safety 
net frays, and as the major source of wealth and prosperity declines, 
the willingness of the public to tolerate elite misbehavior also de-
clines.  This response can be offset through increasing militarization 
and intimidation, as is happening through an increased police pres-
ence224 and higher internal security spending.225  But it is unclear what 
happens when food price volatility, which has so far been confined to 
poorer countries, combines with budget cuts to food stamp programs. 
A new social contract is coming.  The outlines of said contract 
could be a far more authoritarian model, where a small protected 
elite lives over what is essentially an occupied colonial body.  Or it 
could be the restoration of an egalitarian model of shared prosperity, 
with sustainability at the core of our social, political, and financial re-
lationships.  In the meantime, until this new social contract emerges, 
it is likely that increasing unrest and discord will be the norm. 
CONCLUSION 
The basis for the New Deal housing consensus was not housing per 
se, it was a macro-economic framework that led to shared nationwide 
prosperity and some level of acceptable fairness.  Investment in infra-
structure, exploitation of cheap oil, unionization, safe banking, and 
transparent capital markets were critical components of this prosperi-
ty.  Housing served as a fulcrum for that system.  Discussing housing 
as a fulcrum for a stagnating economy and a chaotic political envi-
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ronment makes little sense, so this paper attempts to suggest a solu-
tion for moderating the current crisis until a new economic frame-
work emerges. 
Even as this new social contract emerges, it will be necessary to ad-
dress the basic problems in the current multi-trillion dollar housing 
market.  The basics of any approach will require a restoration of 
transparency and integrity to the market. 
Whatever economic strategy emerges, housing values must be cor-
related with wage increases or decreases.  Additionally, housing fi-
nance should require more equity; people need to have a stake in 
their homes.  The following suggestions would help stop some bleed-
ing in the current housing market and possibly prevent a wholesale 
collapse. 
The key to restructuring the current housing morass is building a 
trusted intermediary institution, such as the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation, that can write down debts to manageable levels.  Such 
an institution would allow currently defaulted homeowners to remain 
as renters in their homes, write down principal to a manageable level, 
or foreclose.  Changes to bankruptcy laws, in particular the right for 
judges to write down first mortgages on primary residences, would 
help provide a second layer of defense for rationality in the financial 
markets. 
Aggressive law enforcement to prosecute mortgage and foreclosure 
fraud would help restore confidence in the mortgage market, as well 
as prevent the transformation of existing housing stock into massive 
blighted sets of suburban ghost towns.  Secondary liability needs to be 
reintroduced in criminal law—if you help perpetrate a fraud, you 
should be charged as an accessory.  This would eliminate the legions 
of lawyers and accountants who can aid criminal behavior without 
consequence. Extending the statute of limitations on securities abuses 
would help. 
The mortgage servicing industry is thinly capitalized, excessively 
automated, and inadequately staffed.226  It needs to be restructured 
and tightly regulated.  Loan-level data needs to be disclosed to inves-
tors on a regular basis to prevent securitization abuses.  A mortgage 
should be held for a year before it can be securitized, and there 
should be no resecuritizations of slices of baskets of mortgages (i.e. 
 
 226. See generally The Foreclosure Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Over-
sight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Mark A. Kaufman, 
Comm’r of Financial Regulation, Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and 
Regulation). 
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no “CDO-squared”).  And finally, structures to enable consumer pro-
tection, either through national and state-based homeowner associa-
tions initially capitalized by government, or effective non-captured 
government regulatory agencies, are critical to arresting rampant 
fraud in the mortgage servicing industry. 
